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COMMENT
CORE DEPOSIT BASE: GOODWILL OR NOT
GOODWILL - IS THAT THE QUESTION?
The term "core deposits" is used in the banking industry to refer to a
bank's gross or total dollar value of deposits; the term generally refers to the
bank's savings, checking, and time deposit accounts.' Core deposits are of
particular importance to banks because they provide a low cost source of
funds.2 Depositors invest their funds in banks, typically earning five to six
percent on their savings deposits, with a slightly higher rate of return on
time deposit accounts such as certificates of deposit.3 Banks, by aggregating
the relatively small account balances of individual depositors, can invest in
assets that earn a substantially higher rate of return than those available to
individual depositors.
The interest rate spread between a bank's costs and its potential earnings
on these deposits is the basis for calculating a bank's "core deposit base."4
More precisely, the core deposit base is an intangible asset on a bank's bal-
ance sheet equal to the present value of the future net income stream gener-
ated by a bank's acquired core deposits.5 Theoretically, when a bank is
1. See AmSouth Bancorp. v. United States, 681 F. Supp. 698, 699 (N.D. Ala. 1988);
Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463, 465 (1988), affid without opinion,
900 F.2d 266 (l1th Cir. 1990); Banc One Corp. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 476, 490 (1985),
affid, 815 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1987). Time deposit accounts are funds placed with the bank and
payable after a specified number of days or after a specified notice period. WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2395 (1981). Banks will pay a slightly higher interest
rate on these deposits in return for the depositor's promise to keep the funds deposited for a
specified time period.
2. AmSouth, 681 F. Supp. at 705; Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 465-66; Banc One, 84
T.C. at 490; Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1464, 1465-66 (1983).
3. See AmSouth, 681 F. Supp. at 699, 705; Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 465-66.
4. AmSouth, 681 F. Supp. at 705-06. Core deposits represent a liability to the banks.
Customers deposit their funds into a bank, and the bank's cash is increased along with the
bank's corresponding liability to repay the customers when requested. When the word "base"
is attached to the term "core deposit" (core deposit base), that term represents, and will be
used throughout this Comment to represent, the intangible asset equal to the present value of
the future net income stream generated by the acquired core deposits. See id. at 699 n.3;
Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 465-66. In addition, this Comment uses the terms "deposit
base," "deposit base intangible," and "core deposit intangible" interchangeably to refer to this
intangible asset.
5. Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 465.
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acquired, the purchaser determines the fair market value of the bank's assets.
The total of the fair market value of the individual assets, less the amount of
any liabilities assumed, constitutes the price the purchaser is willing to pay
for the bank. In addition, the purchaser normally pays a premium above the
total net asset value of the bank, under the premise that the value of the
assets together is worth more than the total of the values of the individual
assets. Accountants describe this additional premium as goodwill or going
concern value.
A problem arises when a purchaser acquires a bank and allocates the
purchase price among the assets in the underlying business. Section 167 of
the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) sets forth the rules for obtaining a
depreciation deduction: a deduction for the exhaustion and wear and tear of
certain property used in a trade or business or held for the production of
income.7 Amortization is the depreciation equivalent for intangible assets."
The Treasury regulations for section 167 permit a depreciation deduction for
an intangible asset if the asset is known to be of use in the business for a
limited period of time.9 The regulations, however, do not permit a deprecia-
6. Goodwill is defined as the:
excess of cost of an acquired firm or operating unit over the current or fair market
value of [the] net assets of the acquired unit. [It is] [i]nformally used to indicate the
value of good customer relations, high employee morale, [and] a well-respected busi-
ness name... which are expected to result in greater than normal earning power.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 625 (5th ed. 1979). The phrase "going concern value" is defined
as the "value of the assets of a business as a going, active concern, rather than merely as items
of property[,] which would be the case in a liquidation sale. Such value includes goodwill."
Id. at 622.
7. Section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code provides: "(a) General rule.-There shall
be allowed as a depreciation deduction a reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and
tear (including a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) - (1) of property used in the trade or
business, or (2) of property held for the production of income." I.R.C. § 167(a) (West. Supp.
1990).
8. Amortization is the term used to describe the periodic charge-off of a portion of an
intangible asset against income. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 76 (5th ed. 1979). Depreciation
is the term used to describe the periodic charge-off of a portion of a tangible asset. Id. at 397.
While the term "depreciation" may refer to the exhaustion of an intangible asset, the techni-
cally correct term with respect to intangible assets is amortization. For ease of reference,
however, this Comment will use the terms interchangeably.
9. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960). The full text provides:
If an intangible asset is known from experience or other factors to be of use in the
business or in the production of income for only a limited period, the length of which
can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, such an intangible asset may be the sub-
ject of a depreciation allowance. Examples are patents and copyrights. An intangi-
ble asset, the useful life of which is not limited, is not subject to the allowance for
depreciation. No allowance will be permitted merely because, in the unsupported
opinion of the taxpayer, the intangible asset has a limited useful life. No deduction
for depreciation is allowable with respect to goodwill.
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tion deduction for goodwill."° Therefore, if the acquiring bank allocates a
portion of its purchase price to the core deposit base in lieu of goodwill, the
bank may identify an asset for which it can take a depreciation deduction,
thereby reducing its taxable income and tax liability. Courts are reluctant,
however, to recognize this allocation for tax purposes."1
Prior to 1988, several courts addressed the issue of amortization of an
acquired core deposit base, denying amortization on every occasion.' 2 The
1988 Tax Court decision of Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner pro-
vided the banks with their first major victory. 3 In Citizens & Southern, the
bank's experts prepared voluminous and detailed reports, which estimated
the value of the core deposit base.' 4 Relying on these reports, the Tax Court
permitted Citizens & Southern to take a depreciation deduction for the ac-
quired core deposit base.' 5 In addition, post acquisition data that corrobo-
rated the expert's valuation of the deposit base was influential in the court's
holding.1 6 Yet, despite the favorable ruling, the Citizens & Southern court,
as well as other courts, did not emphasize what at least one commentator
considers the crucial issue: Whether the core deposit base is an intangible
asset separate and distinct from goodwill as a matter of law.17
10. Id
11. See, e.g., AmSouth, 681 F. Supp. at 719 ("The court ultimately finds and concludes...
that [the] plaintiff has not met its burden of proving that the customer deposit base had a value
which was separate and distinct from the goodwill [of the acquired bank] ...."); Banc One, 84
T.C. at 502 n.6 (holding that, based upon the record, the taxpayer was not entitled to depreci-
ate any acquired core deposit intangible); cf Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 514 ("We con-
clude that petitioner's tax method of depreciating [the] deposit base results in a fair allocation
of the basis of the asset to periods in which benefit is realized and provides petitioner a reason-
able allowance for depreciation.").
12. See, e.g., Southern Bancorp. v. United States, 732 F.2d 374, 376 n.2, 377 (4th Cir.
1984) (petitioner not permitted to amortize a portion of the purchase price premium allocated
to loan portfolios because petitioner conducted the allocation "post hoc," and the court re-
fused to address the issue of deposit base amortization because petitioner failed to raise the
issue at trial), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985); AmSouth, 681 F. Supp. at 714, 719 (although
petitioner failed to establish that the intangible was separate and distinct from goodwill, the
court conceded that the deposit base may have a limited useful life); Banc One, 84 T.C. at 498
(petitioner failed to sustain his burden of proof with respect to the allocation of a portion of the
purchase price to the core deposit base); cf Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1475
(petitioner permitted to amortize the solicitation right, an asset analogous to the core deposit
base, acquired when petitioner purchased a bank that had failed).
13. Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 514 (Tax Court allowed bank to take depreciation
deduction for acquired core deposit base).
14. Id. at 469-73.
15. Id. at 467-73, 514.
16. Id. at 473-79, 501-03, 514.
17. See Blasi, Banks Win Major Victory on Core Deposit Amortization, but the Battle Con-
tinues, J. BANK TAX'N 5, 7 (Winter 1989) ("Whether goodwill exists is a factual issue: how-
ever, what is goodwill should be a legal matter.... By failing to directly resolve the legal issue
1990]
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This Comment addresses the issue of whether the deposit base is an intan-
gible asset separate and distinct from goodwill. This Comment explains why
the Citizens & Southern court's decision not to emphasize the separate and
distinct requirement, but rather to focus on determining whether the core
deposit base has a limited useful life, was correct. The Comment first sets
forth the applicable Internal Revenue Code section, which outlines the rules
regarding depreciation, and then synthesizes the Internal Revenue Service's
position on the depreciation of the core deposit intangible, as explained in
the Treasury regulations and revenue rulings. Second, this Comment re-
views the case law supplementing the depreciation and amortization code
provisions as it relates to the core deposit intangible and emphasizes the Tax
Court's latest decision in Citizens & Southern. The Comment then examines
the two elements required by the courts for the amortization of an intangible
asset: the separate and distinct requirement and the limited useful life re-
quirement. In addition, this Comment briefly compares the deposit base in-
tangible to other amortizable intangible assets to support amortization of the
core deposit base. Lastly, this Comment discusses why, based upon the pol-
icy behind the depreciation deduction, courts should focus more heavily on
the proof requirement for establishing a limited useful life for the deposit
base and should focus less on the separate and distinct requirement.
1. THE FOUNDATION UPON WHICH THE
DEPRECIATION DEDUCTION IS BUILT
A. Internal Revenue Code Section 167
"The Internal Revenue Code's general section allowing taxpayers to de-
preciate certain property seems, at least at first blush, to be the essence of
simplicity ... ."'8 A quick reading of the depreciation provision19 tends to
support such a statement. The Code provides an allowance in the nature of
a deduction, called depreciation, for the decline in value of property used in
a trade or business or held for the production of income.20 Property in-
cludes both tangible property, 2' such as buildings and machinery, and intan-
of whether the core deposit intangible is goodwill, the Court has perpetuated the judicial con-
troversy." (footnote omitted)).
18. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974).
19. I.R.C. § 167(a) (West Supp. 1990); see also supra note 7.
20. I.R.C. § 167(a) (West Supp. 1990); see also supra note 7.
21. See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (as amended in 1960) ("[T]he depreciation allowance in
the case of tangible property applies only to that part of the property which is subject to wear
and tear, . . . and to obsolescence.").
[Vol. 39:795
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gible property,22 such as patents and copyrights.23 The Code, therefore, sets
a very broad test for depreciability: Whether the property is used in a trade
or business or is held for the production of income; and whether the prop-
erty will deteriorate and become obsolete.24 The apparent "simplicity" of
the general Code provision, however, dissipates when one considers the reg-
ulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury interpreting section
167.
B. The Internal Revenue Service's Interpretation of Section 167
The Internal Revenue Code delegates to the Secretary of the Treasury
general authority to prescribe the rules and regulations necessary for en-
forcement of the provisions of the Code.25 The Internal Revenue Service
(Service), a division of the Treasury Department, is the administrative
agency that carries out the function of promulgating these regulations. 6
Section 1.167 of the Treasury regulations interprets Code section 167 and
states the Service's definition of the basic factors determinative of a deprecia-
tion deduction, such as "reasonable allowance' 27 and "useful life,",21 for
both tangible29 and intangible 30 assets.
1. Tangible and Intangible Property Generally Defined
The depreciation allowance for tangible property is more easily recognized
than the depreciation allowance for intangible property because of the differ-
ence in the nature of the assets. Tangible property, such as machinery and
22. Treas. Reg. § 1. 167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960); see also supra note 9.
23. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960); see also supra note 9.
24. The theory behind permitting a deduction for obsolescence ratably over the asset's life
is based upon the accounting principle known as matching. The matching principle requires,
to more accurately reflect the "true" net income from a particular asset, that expenses relating
to an asset be permitted as a deduction in the year in which the expenses produce the income.
G. WELSCH, C. ZLATKOVICH, & J. WHITE, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 15 (rev. ed. 1968).
Therefore, through timing devices, such as capitalization and depreciation, items of income
and expense are properly "matched." See id.
25. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (West Supp. 1990).
26. See I.R.C. § 7802 (West Supp. 1990); [1990] 12 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH)
44,266.01.
27. See Treas. Reg. § 1. 167(a)-l(a) (as amended in 1972) (stating that the amount allowed
as a depreciation deduction should be part of a consistent plan whereby at the end of the asset's
useful life the amounts set aside each year will equal the total cost of such asset).
28. See id. § 1. 167(a)-l(b). Useful life is determined not with respect to the life of the
asset in general, but with respect to the useful life of the asset in the taxpayer's trade or busi-
ness. The taxpayer may refer to its own experiences with similar property, or to the exper-
iences of the industry if the taxpayer's own experiences are inadequate, to determine the asset's
useful life. Id.
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2 (as amended in 1960).
30. Id. § 1. 167(a)-3; see also supra note 9.
1990]
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buildings, physically deteriorates, and the taxpayer can easily quantify this
decrease in value by physically observing the property. Intangible property,
however, cannot be physically inspected, making a determination of any de-
crease in the asset's value difficult. 3'
With respect to intangible assets, the regulations provide that a deprecia-
tion deduction will be allowed if it is known from experience that the tax-
payer will use the asset in the business for only a limited period of time.32
Furthermore, the limited time must be measurable with reasonable accu-
racy.33 The regulations include patents and copyrights as specific examples
of intangible property with limited useful lives measurable with reasonable
accuracy. In contrast, the regulations prohibit a depreciation deduction
for any intangible asset where the basis for the asset's limited useful life is
merely the unsupported opinion of the taxpayer.
35
2. Why Goodwill is Per Se Nondepreciable
Based upon the requirement that the intangible asset must have a limited
useful life, the regulations also provide that "[n]o deduction for depreciation
is allowable with respect to goodwill."' 36 The case law is well settled on this
point.37 The value built up in a business through customer relations, operat-
ing efficiency, business name, and other attributes of goodwill will remain
with the business as long as the taxpayer operates it as a unit. Even if a
taxpayer can prove that the goodwill built up in his business will decline in
value or "waste away," the taxpayer will still find it difficult to demonstrate
a "limited" useful life with sufficient accuracy to sustain a depreciation de-
duction. 38 Therefore, the Service has developed a test, adopted by most
courts, with respect to the amortization of intangibles: Where the asset is
characterized as being in the nature of goodwill, the asset does not have a
31. With regard to real property, the asset's value generally increases over time, especially
during highly inflationary periods. Despite the economic reality that the asset is likely not to
depreciate in value, the Code still permits a depreciation deduction. Because of the amorphous
characteristics surrounding most intangible assets, particularly the core deposit base, courts
have trouble quantifying a limited useful life for the intangible asset. For this reason, courts
often conclude that the asset is nonamortizable.
32. Treas. Reg. § 1. 167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960); see also supra note 9.




37. Computing & Software, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 223, 232 n.7 (1975) (citing
Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. United States, 444 F.2d 677, 685-686 (5th Cir. 1971); Marsh
& McLennan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 420 F.2d 667, 668 (3d Cir. 1969), arf'g 51 T.C. 56 (1968);
United States v. Cornish, 348 F.2d 175, 185 (9th Cir. 1965)).
38. The difficulty arises because the taxpayer must predict when his business will cease to
exist in order to demonstrate the limits of the life of the goodwill.
[Vol. 39:795
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limited useful life that can be measured with reasonable accuracy, and the
depreciation deduction should be disallowed. 9 The burden falls on the tax-
payer to support a claim that the asset has a limited useful life.' In effect,
the taxpayer must argue that the asset is separate and distinct from goodwill
before a depreciation deduction will be permitted.4 The question is: How
separate and distinct must the asset be from goodwill? Subscription and cus-
tomer lists are intangible assets with similar characteristics to the core de-
posit base,42 and the Service's position with respect to the amortization of
these similar intangibles provides a useful analogy to the amortization of the
core deposit base.
3. Abandonment of a Per Se Rule of Nondepreciability as to Other
Intangible Assets
Initially, the Service's position with regard to subscription and customer
lists was that these assets have an indeterminate useful life43 and therefore
are nonamortizable. The Service consistently applied the same rationale to
insurance expirations," another intangible asset similar to subscription and
customer lists. 45 The Service retreated from its stringent position, however,
later conceding that these assets are not nonamortizable per se.46 This
change in the Service's policy on nonamortization was precipitated by a Tax
39. See, e.g., Sunset Fuel Co. v. United States, 519 F.2d 781, 783-84 (9th Cir. 1975);
Marsh & McLennan, 420 F.2d at 668-69; Computing & Software, 64 T.C. at 232.
40. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v.
United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1245 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974).
41. Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463, 479 (1988) (finding that
"petitioner must show that the deposit base... had an ascertainable cost basis separate and
distinct from the goodwill... of the [a]cquired [b]anks"), aff'd without opinion, 900 F.2d 266
(11th Cir. 1990); see also Houston Chronicle, 481 F.2d at 1245-51.
42. See infra notes 219-25, 232-39 and accompanying text.
43. Rev. Rul. 65-175, 1965-2 C.B. 41 ("An analogy may be drawn to cases involving
customer lists and newspaper subscription lists, wherein it has been held that these assets are
not exhausted by time, and maintain a continuing value and useful life which precludes the
allowance of any deduction for exhaustion thereof.").
44. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 65-180, 1965-2 C.B. 279.
45. See infra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
46. Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2 C.B. 65 (finding that customer and subscription lists and
insurance expirations are not nonamortizable as a matter of law and that these assets will be
amortizable in the unusual case where the asset may be shown to be separate and distinct from
goodwill and used in a trade or business for a limited period). Under this ruling, "Rev. Rul.
65-175 and 65-180 are modified to remove any implication that customer and subscription
lists, location contracts, insurance expirations ... are as a matter of law, indistinguishable
from goodwill possessing no determinable useful life." Id.; see also Retail Industry Specializa-
tion Program of Position Papers-Customer Based Intangibles, Tax Analyst's Daily Tax High-
lights & Documents, July 23, 1990, at 802.
1990]
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Court decision47 in which the taxpayer was permitted to amortize an ac-
quired customer list after sustaining the high burden of proof with respect to
the asset's useful life.4" Under its "new" position, the Service will permit a
depreciation deduction in the unusual case where a customer list or similar
intangible asset does not possess the characteristics of goodwill, is subject to
individual valuation, and has a determinable useful life.49 The Tax Court
framed the issue as one of fact and opened the door for a case by case ap-
proach to defining the outer bounds of the depreciation deduction for intan-
gible assets.
II. MIDLANTIC THRU CITIZENS: THE ROAD TO AMORTIZABILITY
A. Midlantic: The Failed Bank Situation
The first major case in the development of amortization of acquired core
deposits was Midlantic National Bank v. Commissioner.50 Eatontown Na-
tional Bank (ENB) was a failing bank that the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency5' declared insolvent and ordered closed.52 ENB's president embezzled
nearly four million dollars from the bank, and the extensive media coverage
severely diminished, if not eliminated, any goodwill attributable to ENB.53
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was responsible for
paying off ENB's depositors up to the amount of their deposit insurance.
54
To defray the cost of the bank failure, the FDIC sought bids from financial
institutions for the right to solicit deposits from former ENB depositors on
the date that the FDIC paid the claims.55 The solicitation right was valuable
to banking institutions because it afforded them a means of acquiring a sig-
nificant amount of funds in a brief period of time.56 Midlantic submitted a
47. Manhattan Co. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 78 (1968).
48. Id. at 91-92 (based upon the facts contained in the record, the court determined that
the taxpayer sustained its burden of proof, thereby justifying an allocation of the purchase
price of a customer list among the depreciable and nondepreciable portions).
49. Rev. Rul. 74-456, 1974-2 C.B. 65.
50. 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1464 (1983).
51. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is within the United States Department
of the Treasury. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1465.
54. Id. The insurance limit then applicable was $20,000; any depositor with a balance
above this limit generally stood to lose the excess. Id.
55. The solicitation right permitted the financial institution to be on the ENB premises on
the specific day the FDIC paid the funds to the former ENB depositors. Id. As a depositor
received its check and exited the bank, the financial institution's employees sought to have the
former ENB depositor deposit its money with their institution. Id.
56. Id. at 1465-66.
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final bid of $1,500,110 for the solicitation right and was the successful
bidder."
Despite Midlantic's attempts to disassociate itself from ENB, Midlantic's
total acquired deposits were substantially lower than its projections.5" The
reduced dollar value of the acquired deposits was due in part to the custom-
ers' "badwill" toward ENB and to a skepticism toward all banks, including
Midlantic, as a result of ENB's mismanagement.59 In total, Midlantic ac-
quired 1,755 deposit accounts equaling $2,505,627. 60 For tax purposes,
Midlantic allocated $696,763 of the bid price to the real property, based
upon an appraisal of the building, and the residual sum of $803,347 to the
solicitation right.6" Midlantic subsequently attempted to amortize the allo-
cated cost of the solicitation right over the estimated useful life of the ac-
quired core deposits.62
The Service challenged Midlantic's amortization deductions, contending
that Midlantic must allocate the value attributable to the solicitation right
among various nonamortizable intangible assets similar and inseparable
from goodwill.63 The Tax Court held that because of the failed bank status
of ENB, Midlantic did not acquire goodwill or going concern value.64 Once
the court established that Midlantic acquired no goodwill, it determined that
the bank could prevail, provided the bank demonstrated that the solicitation
right had a limited useful life.65 Noting that this determination was an issue
57. Id at 1466. Midlantic estimated that the building and improvements were worth
between $700,000 and $800,000 and that the solicitation right was worth approximately
$700,000. Id The value of the solicitation right was based upon a "rule of thumb" applied in
bank acquisitions that appraised the value of acquired core deposits at between six and seven
percent of the bank's total core deposits. Id. Midlantic estimated that ENB had $16,000,000
in total deposits and that they could acquire between $8,000,000 and $10,000,000 of these total
deposits. Id Applying the "rule of thumb," Midlantic calculated the value of the solicitation
right as $700,000. Id. In Midlantic, the successful bidder also acquired the property rights to
the building and other real property owned by ENB.
58. See id. at 1467, 1473.
59. Id.
60. Id
61. Id at 1468.
62. Id. at 1468-69.
63. Id. at 1470.
64. Id. at 1471 ("To the contrary, the record shows that petitioner did not even consider
goodwill in formulating its bid... because it had reached the none-too-difficult conclusion that
a bank that had failed and had been closed had no goodwill to offer.").
65. Id at 1474. In addition, the Commissioner attempted to allocate the bid price to
"various intangible assets," which the Service considered nonamortizable. Id. at 1471. These
intangible assets included advantageous location, the expectation that depositors would return
to the familiar location, the expectation of immediate FDIC approval for a branch office, the
solicitation of ENB employees, and going concern value. The court, however, rejected these
assertions. Id. at 1471-73.
1990]
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of fact,66 the court concluded that the solicitation right was a depreciating
asset with an ascertainable useful life.
6 7
The Tax Court's decision in Midlantic was important in two respects.
First, the court held that the acquired solicitation right was a wasting asset
that had a determinable useful life.6" The Midlantic court did not hold as a
matter of law that this intangible had an unlimited useful life.69 Instead, the
court established that the taxpayer need only estimate the intangible's useful
life as he would any other recognized depreciable asset to obtain a deprecia-
tion deduction.70 By framing the issue as one of fact, the court made it
easier for taxpayers to prove a limited useful life with "reasonable accuracy."
To satisfy his burden of proof, the taxpayer must provide the court with
detailed supporting documentation, such as expert reports.71
Second, the court held that the intangible asset itself, in this case the solic-
itation right, had a value "akin to th[at] ... of a customer list."' 72 By classi-
fying the intangible in the category of customer lists, which are amortizable
assets, instead of linking the asset to goodwill, the court directed its analysis
of the deposit base towards depreciability." While the intangible asset at
issue in Midlantic was not the core deposit base intangible, but rather the
right to solicit depositors, 4 the findings of the court provided a foundation
upon which the later core deposit base decisions could evolve.
66. Id. at 1469, 1474-75; see also Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481
F.2d 1240, 1245-51 (5th Cir. 1973) (finding that the issue of whether subscription lists are
amortizable assets is a question of fact), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974). After reviewing
the prior case law, the Houston Chronicle court stated: "Each of these cases represents the
failure of a given taxpayer to carry his burden of bringing his claim within the factual borders
that would support an amortization deduction-none rules that the asset involved is per se
non-amortizable." Id. at 1247; see also Commissioner v. Seaboard Fin. Co., 367 F.2d 646, 650-
51 (9th Cir. 1966) (holding that there was no legal question presented and determining that the
Tax Court's findings of fact were not clearly erroneous).
67. Midlantic 46 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1474. The court, however, allocated ten percent of
the solicitation right to an element of nonamortizable value, reasoning that a small number of
accounts acquired had substantially larger balances. Id. The evidence indicated that these
accounts had a longer useful life, which the taxpayer could not reasonably estimate. Id. at
1474 n.18.
68. Id. at 1470, 1474.
69. Id. at 1470.
70. Id. at 1469.
71. See, e.g., Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463, 469-73, 514
(1988), afid without opinion, 900 F.2d 266 (11 th Cir. 1990). The petitioner overcame its proof
requirements by performing a detailed analysis contained in the report submitted to the court.
Id.; see also infra notes 130-32 and accompanying text.
72. Midlantic, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1469.
73. See generally id. at 1464-75.
74. Id. at 1464. The right to solicit depositors, however, is a cost attributable to the ac-
quired deposit accounts. Therefore, the taxpayer should write off the cost of the solicitation
right as the acquired deposit accounts close. This analysis parallels the analysis regarding the
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R Banc One: Denial of Depreciation Deductions Based Upon a Post Hoc
Determination of Useful Life
Banc One Corp. v. Commissioner,7 5 the first Tax Court case to directly
address the issue of amortization of the core deposit base,"6 reinforced the
fact sensitive analysis set forth in Midlantic."7  Banc One acquired two
banks: First Citizens (Citizens) 7' and Athens National Bank (Athens).
79
The original purchase agreements between the parties did not allocate the
purchase price among the assets.80 Banc One engaged an accounting firm to
perform the necessary allocations after completing the purchases."' The ac-
counting firm allocated a portion of the purchase price to the deposit base
intangible and amortized this cost on Banc One's tax returns.8 2 The Service,
disallowing the amortization deductions attributable to the deposit base, de-
termined that Banc One's tax returns were deficient in the amount of
$1,422,528.83
write off of the deposit base intangible. The portion of the core deposit base attributable to
each acquired deposit account is written off as the deposit account closes. Therefore, while the
intangible in Midlantic is not the core deposit base, it is sufficiently analogous to warrant
consideration.
75. 84 T.C. 476 (1985), affid, 815 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1987).
76. Id. Cf Southern Bancorp. v. United States, 732 F.2d 374 (4th Cir. 1984), cert de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1207 (1985). In Southern Bancorp., the taxpayer argued, in the alternative, that
it could amortize the purchase price premium attributable to the acquired core deposit base.
Id. at 377. The taxpayer did not pursue the issue at trial however; nor did the taxpayer sustain
the allegations. Id. at 376 n.2, 377 n.6.
77. See generally Banc One, 84 T.C. at 498-02.
78. Id. at 487-88. Banc One acquired First Citizens in mid-1973 for approximately
$11,500,000. Id.
79. Id at 480, 484. Banc One acquired Athens in late 1974 for approximately
$49,000,000. Id
80. Id. at 479, 487.
81. Id at 479, 481. The allocation consisted of a two step process whereby the assets were
restated at their fair market values. Id. at 481. The accounting firm allocated the difference
between the purchase price and the fair market value of the assets proportionally among the
individual assets based upon the ratio of the individual asset's value to the total fair market
value of all the assets. Id. The firm included goodwill in step one of the allocation based upon
a capitalized average annual excess return figure. Id. at 482-83. It then increased the good-
will/going concern values along with the other assets in accordance with the second step of the
allocation procedure. Id at 484, 488. The court refused to permit the two step allocation and
required the taxpayer to use the residual method. Id at 506 ("[U]se of the residual method [of
valuation] is proper in the present case, and we would reject [the accounting firm's] determina-
tions under the formula method on that basis alone."). Generally, the residual method re-
quires that the taxpayer allocate the purchase price among the assets, both tangible and
intangible, up to their fair market value with the residual allocated to goodwill. 15 MERTEN'S
LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX § 59.71 (1989) [hereinafter MERTEN].
82. Banc One, 84 T.C. at 489.
83. Id. at 476.
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The Service attacked Banc One's allocation and amortization deductions
on several grounds. The Service determined that the deposit base was not
separable from goodwill and that it was self regenerative and therefore did
not have a limited useful life. 4 The Service also found that the bank's
method of depreciation was improper."5 Overlooking the Service's first two
main claims, the court disallowed the deductions based upon Banc One's
post hoc method of depreciation.8 6 In quantifying the amount of the deduc-
tion, Banc One relied upon reports prepared almost six years after the
purchases to demonstrate that the deposit base was a wasting asset with a
limited useful life. 7 Although the court recognized that absolute certainty
was not required as to the asset's useful life,88 it stressed that prediction of
the asset's useful life was the core of depreciation accounting.8 9 The court
would not permit the taxpayer to rely upon expert testimony using facts that
occurred after the close of the tax year in order to establish the asset's lim-
84. Id. at 498. If an asset is "self regenerative," the court determines that any wasting
away of the asset is subsequently replaced and thus the asset as a whole does not have a limited
useful life. See Computing & Software, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 223, 236 (1975) (hold-
ing an acquired customer list depreciable despite the fact that the internally generated credit
information would replace the purchased information contained in the list). Under this the-
ory, new depositors would replace the acquired depositors that are lost. Without a loss of
depositors, there is no reduction in the bank's core deposits. This argument, however, does not
focus on the asset in question. The asset depreciated relates to the acquired core deposits and
not to the bank's total core deposits. Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C.
463, 499 (1988), affid without opinion, 900 F.2d 266 (1lth Cir. 1990); accord Computing &
Software, 64 T.C. at 236. As a bank loses its acquired core deposits, it should reduce the
corresponding deposit base intangible proportionally. Thus, when the total acquired core de-
posits are reduced to zero, the deposit base intangible should also be zero. The fact that the
bank's own internally generated core deposits are slowly replacing the acquired core deposits
has no bearing upon the depreciability of the acquired core deposits.
85. Banc One, 84 T.C. at 498.
86. Banc One, 84 T.C. at 498-501. A post hoc method of depreciation is one that is
selected after the fact. Id. at 498. Courts generally have required that the taxpayer determine
the method of depreciation as of the close of the taxable year based upon the facts as they exist
at the close of the year. See, e.g., id. at 499; Western Terminal Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d
826, 826-27 (9th Cir. 1969); Commissioner v. Cleveland Adolph Mayer Realty Corp., 160 F.2d
1012, 1013-15 (6th Cir. 1947); Roy H. Park Broadcasting v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 1093, 1122
(1982); Airport Bldg. Dev. Corp. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 538, 541 (1972); Westinghouse
Broadcasting Co. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 912, 921-22 (1961), affid, 309 F.2d 279 (3d Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 935 (1963).
87. Banc One, 84 T.C. at 490, 498.
88. Id. at 499 ("[T]he taxpayer need only determine a 'reasonable approximation' for de-
preciation; absolute certainty is not required." (citing Burnet v. Niagara Falls Brewing Co.,
282 U.S. 648 (1931); Super Food Serv., Inc. v. United States, 416 F.2d 1236 (7th Cir. 1969);




ited useful life."° Furthermore, because the court denied the depreciation
deduction based upon the taxpayer's post hoc method of depreciation, it re-
fused to consider whether the core deposit base possessed a value separate
and distinct from goodwill.9 ' Although the court reserved judgement on the
separate and distinct analysis, however, it reinforced Midlantic's fact sensi-
tive approach.
The court in Banc One addressed the burden of proof issue as to the de-
posit base intangible's useful life because an important distinguishing feature
in Banc One was not present in the facts of the Midlantic case. Because
Midlantic was a "failed" bank situation, 92 the Midlantic court disposed of
the separate and distinct issue summarily. Reasoning that ENB had no
goodwill,9 3 the court determined that the solicitation right was separate and
distinct from goodwill.94 In Banc One, however, the acquired banks were
solvent, and there were no major adverse factors evidencing a lack of good-
will.93 Therefore, the Banc One court had to address either the separate and
distinct issue or dispose of the case on other grounds. Emphasizing the tax-
payer's failure to prove that the asset had a limited useful life at the time the
asset was acquired, the court denied the deduction without addressing the
separate and distinct requirement. 96 Thus, the Banc One court was spared
from analyzing the issue of whether the deposit base had a value separate
and distinct from goodwill. This issue was finally ripe for decision, however,
in AmSouth Bancorp. v. United States.97
90. Id at 498-99; see also Western Terminal Co., 412 F.2d at 826-27 (the trial court
should not permit the use of hindsight evidence to determine useful life); Cleveland Adolph
Mayer Realty Corp., 160 F.2d at 1015 ("The crucial factor is not what 'now appears', but what
'then appeared' to be the useful life of the [asset]; that is, what reasonably was known and
ascertainable at the end of each of such periods as to the reasonably foreseeable useful life of
the [asset]." (quoting Commissioner v. Mutual Fertilizer Co., 159 F.2d 470, 472 (5th Cir.
1947) (emphasis omitted))); Roy H. Park Broadcasting, 78 T.C. at 1122; Airport Bldg. Dev.
Corp., 58 T.C. at 541; Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 36 T.C. at 921-22.
91. Banc One, 84 T.C. at 502 n.6.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 51-55, 64-65.
93. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1464, 1471 (1983).
94. Id. It again should be mentioned that the solicitation right differs from the core de-
posit base, but the depreciability of both assets hinges upon their relationship to the acquired
core deposits. See supra note 74.
95. Banc One, 84 T.C. at 506-07. The purchaser tried to establish that one of the acquired
banks had no goodwill based upon an average excess earnings calculation. Id. at 505-06.
Although the court disagreed with the purchaser's argument, it disallowed the deduction on
other grounds. Id at 498.
96. Id. at 498, 502 n.6.
97. 681 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
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C. AmSouth: Shifting the Analysis from Useful Life to a Determination
of Whether There is a Value Separate and Distinct
from Goodwill
In AmSouth, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama was forced to address the separate and distinct nature of the core
deposit base, an issue that the Tax Court avoided in Banc One, when Am-
South acquired the assets and liabilities of the Bank of East Alabama
(BEA). 98 Although the bank had not failed as in Midlantic, BEA was in a
"distressed" condition due to numerous bad loans and alleged criminal ac-
tivity on the part of BEA's former president.99 At the time of the sale, Am-
South did not allocate the purchase price among the individual assets and
there was no evidence of any realistic negotiations as to the value of the
deposit base.l"c A few months after the parties executed the agreement for
sale, however, AmSouth executed another agreement with BEA, detailing
the allocation of the purchase price among the various assets.101
AmSouth subsequently engaged two firms to determine the value and esti-
mated useful life of the acquired deposit base."0 2 Both firms used BEA's
history of closed accounts, as well as mortality and relocation rates, in for-
mulating their opinions."0 3 Recognizing that there was no "scientifically ac-
curate way to measure" the life of the deposit base, the court determined
that the estimates of the two analysts may be reasonable." ° Here, the seeds
planted by the Tax Court in Midlantic, when it stated that the deposit base
98. The acquisition occurred during February of 1979, and the acquisition price was ap-
proximately $4,800,000. Id. at 699.
99. Id. at 703-05. The former bank president had used funds from the bank for his per-
sonal benefit. Id. Consequently, there were numerous criminal charges brought against him.
Id. In spite of the negative publicity, the court stated that there was "no substantial evidence
that the publicity itself adversely affected the bank's financial status or goodwill." Id at 704.
100. Id. at 702.
101. The final agreement allocated $1,700,000, approximately one-quarter of the total sales
price, to the customer deposit base. Id. at 702-03.
102. Id. at 705. Ernst & Ernst, an accounting firm, determined the value of the deposit
base intangible by calculating the differential between AmSouth's incremental borrowing rate
and the alternative funds rate. This differential is multiplied by the projected average balances
of the acquired core deposits over its estimated useful life. Id. Golembe & Associates, Inc., a
bank consulting firm, estimated that the value of the core deposit base was equal to the "dis-
counted present value of the projected net income" stream generated by that portion of the
core deposits that remained at the end of each successive year over the life of the acquired core
deposits. Id. at 705-06.




might have a limited useful life,"°5 and fortified in Banc One, began to bear
fruit.
The court stated that Midlantic suggested a taxpayer could ascertain the
life of the acquired deposit base with some degree of accuracy.'°6 AmSouth
learned from the mistakes of Banc One and engaged its experts to value the
deposit base as of the close of the tax year.' 7 AmSouth appeared to fulfill
the requirements set forth in the prior core deposit cases: substantiation of
the asset's limited useful life to overcome the burden of proof; and estima-
tion based upon facts as of the close of the tax year. '0 The court, however,
reversed the technique used by the Tax Court in Banc One. The court,
bypassing the analysis of limited useful life, concluded that the plaintiff did
not sustain the burden of proof that the deposit base had a value separate
and distinct from goodwill.'0 9
In the court's analysis of the separate and distinct requirement, it elabo-
rated on the handling of the deposit base intangible under Generally Ac-
cepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) as well as under the regulatory rules
promulgated by the Comptroller of the Currency and the FDIC.1
Although both GAAP and the regulatory agencies permit the amortization
of the core deposit base, the court disregarded the agencies' treatment of the
issue on the ground that there were varying purposes served by their respec-
tive rules." 1  The court noted that the goal of taxation was to provide fund-
ing for the operation of the government. 1 2 The court also stated that the
taxpayer need not treat the transaction for tax purposes in the same manner
105. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1464, 1474-75 (1983);
see also supra text accompanying notes 65-71. It is important to note that the intangible asset
in question in Midlantic was not the deposit base intangible, but the solicitation right. Id. at
1464; see also supra note 74.
106. AmSouth, 681 F. Supp. at 714.
107. Id. at 699, 705.
108. See, e.g., Banc One Corp. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 476, 492 (1985), aff'd, 815 F.2d
75 (6th Cir. 1987); Midlantic, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1469.
109. AmSouth, 681 F. Supp. at 721 n.61 ("[I]t has not been necessary for the court to
address specifically the issue of whether the customer deposit base has an ascertainable value
which has a limited useful life, the duration of which can be determined with reasonable
accuracy.").
110. Id. at 707-11.
111. Id. The primary goal of financial accounting is to keep investors, management, and
creditors informed as to an entity's financial position. Id. at 710. This goal requires the great-
est amount of detail possible; the financial attributes of a business should be broken down into
as many component parts as possible to present a more accurate picture. Id. at 707. The goal
of regulatory agencies is to carry out the mandate of the legislature to protect the public from
fraud, and to require that the taxpayers meet certain minimum capitalization thresholds. See
id. at 707.
112. Id. at 710.
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as would financial accountants or regulatory agencies. 1 3 The court, more-
over, observed that even though GAAP and the FDIC rules recognized the
deposit base intangible as an identifiable part of goodwill, this recognition
did not mean that the intangible was an asset wholly separate from good-
will. 14 Under this reasoning, the taxpayer's burden as to the separate and
distinct requirement is significantly higher than merely proving that the de-
posit base has a separate value apart from goodwill;. 5 the deposit base must
be separate and distinct from goodwill as a whole. Unfortunately, the court
did not clarify the requirements necessary for satisfying this higher standard.
After noting several recognized definitions of goodwill,1" 6 the AmSouth
court presumed that the deposit base was not separate and distinct from
goodwill."1 7 Based upon this presumption, the court determined that Am-
South bore the burden of establishing its right to claim a depreciation deduc-
tion and proving the separate and distinct requirement.' The court held
that AmSouth did not sustain its burden as to this requirement." 9 The
court concluded that any premium attributable to the core deposits is too
closely linked to the old depositors returning to the familiar place, thereby
characterizing the premium as goodwill."12
The court in AmSouth followed the lead of Midlantic and Banc One by
focusing on the proof as to the required elements for amortizability, rather
than ruling as a matter of law that the deposit base was nonamortizable.
1 2 1
The limited useful life requirement, as evidenced in Midlantic '2 2 and Banc
One, 123 did not trouble those courts to the same degree as did the separate
and distinct requirement. As the core deposit base gained recognition by the
113. Id.
114. Id. at 708.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 712 ("[t]he nature of goodwill is the expectancy that 'the old customers will
resort to the old place,' .... The essence of goodwill is the expectancy of continued patronage,
for whatever reason."); see also infra text accompanying notes 164-67.
117. AmSouth, 681 F. Supp. at 712.
118. Id. (citing Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1245
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974)).
119. Id. at 719.
120. Id. at 720.
121. Id. at 713.
122. Midlantic, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1474.
123. Banc One, 84 T.C. at 498-501. Although the court in Banc One denied the deprecia-
tion deduction based upon the asset's lack of a limited useful life, the thrust of the court's
decision was not based upon a finding that the core deposit intangible's life was indefinite.
Rather, the holding rested squarely on the taxpayer's post hoc method of depreciation. Id. at
498; see also supra text accompanying notes 86-90. Therefore, the court, although implying
that the deposit base intangible may have a limited useful life, disregarded Banc One's determi-
nation because Banc One estimated this limited life after the close of the tax year.
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regulatory agencies, 24 and as it proved to be a bona fide asset in many bank
acquisitions, courts realized that the intangible was not the product of phony
accounting practices1 25 or a mere chimera. 126 Despite the established law on
the core deposit base, the Tax Court attempted to further clarify its under-
standing of the amortization of the core deposit intangible in Citizens &
Southern Corp. v. Commissioner. 127
D. Citizens & Southern: Recognition that the Core Deposit Base is
Separate and Distinct from Goodwill
In Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 28 the Tax Court read-
dressed the issue of core deposit base amortization. Citizens & Southern
acquired nine banks during a two-year period.1 29 The bank allocated the
purchase price among the assets of the acquired banks and calculated the
value of the deposit intangible based upon detailed valuation reports that
were prepared prior to the acquisition date. 3° For three years following
these purchases, Citizens & Southern also performed impairment studies to
124. This fact is evidenced by the Comptroller of the Currency's change in policy which
now permits the amortization of the deposit base intangible for bank reporting purposes. Citi-
zens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463, 497 (1988) (citing the changes in the
rules by the regulatory agencies, which now mandates the amortization of the deposit base),
affld without opinion, 900 F.2d 266 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
125. See, e.g., AmSouth, 681 F. Supp. at 711 n.45. The court noted that some commenta-
tors have suggested that accountants tend to define "generally accepted" as "'somebody [has]
tried it.'" Id. (quoting an unidentifed authority).
126. Id at 716. A chimera is an "illusion or fabrication of the mind." WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 389 (1981).
127. 91 T.C. 463 (1988), a.rd without opinion, 900 F.2d 266 (11th Cir. 1990).
128. Id
129. Id at 466. The two year period ran from 1981 to 1982, and the total purchase price
for the nine banks exceeded $461 million. Id. at 466-68.
130. Id. at 468-73. Citizens & Southern began the valuation procedure by calculating the
survival probabilities of the various accounts. Id. at 469. This "lifing analysis" consisted of
three phases. First, Citizens & Southern gathered account information including the account
holder's name, the date on which the account was opened, and the dollar balance. Id. at 469-
70. Second, Citizens & Southern conducted a month by month observation for a three to
thirteen month period, which focused on the number of closed accounts during each of the
months observed. Id at 470. Citizens & Southern classified the closed accounts by type and
age, basing the classification upon the date the account was opened. Id. Lastly, Citizens &
Southern combined the monthly results into a runoff table detailing the probability that an
account of a specific age group would remain open for a specified period of time. Id at 470-71.
The next step in the valuation process was to determine the projected net investable balance
for each of the accounts. Id. at 471. Citizens & Southern multiplied the balance in the ac-
counts at the valuation date by the survival probabilities calculated in the lifing analysis and
subtracted the float and reserve requirements to determine the projected net investable balance.
Id. Float represents the uncollected funds in the accounts; these funds are not available for
investment because of the lag time in collection of the funds. Id. The regulatory agencies
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determine whether its initial calculations were correct.' 3 ' These valuation
studies showed that there was no material difference between either the
number of accounts actually closed and the bank's estimated account clo-
sures, or the actual dollar balances and the projected balances in the ac-
counts that comprised the acquired core deposits.' 32 In addition, Citizens &
Southern calculated its annual depreciation deduction as of the acquisition
date, by using the present value of the projected income stream from the
acquired core deposits for each year valued.' 33 The Commissioner disal-
lowed the deductions and sought deficiencies in excess of seven million dol-
lars, 134 arguing, among other issues, that Citizens & Southern failed to
substantiate the limited useful life. and separate and distinct requirements of
the core deposit intangible.
In Citizens & Southern, the Tax Court first stated that the petitioner must,
as a threshold matter, show that the "deposit base [was] an asset separate
and distinct from goodwill" as delineated in prior case law.' 35 The court
distinguished the record in Citizens & Southern from the record in Am-
South.'36 This distinction compelled a different result.137 The court also
rejected the argument that prior case law established a per se rule of
nonamortizability. 38 The court only required that the taxpayer carry his
require that the banks keep reserve requirements on hand; those funds are also unavailable for
investment. Id
In the third step, Citizens & Southern computed the projected earnings from the net invest-
able balances. Id This figure equals the difference between the earnings and costs associated
with the balances. Id. at 471-72. The earnings on the net investable balances equals the sum of
the interest income the funds will generate and the service charge income on each account. Id.
at 472. The costs associated with the net investable balances equal the sum of the interest
expense paid out to account holders and the processing and overhead costs of each account.
Id. at 472-73. Citizens & Southern completed the valuation study by discounting the projected
earnings on the net investable balances in each of the future years to its present value. Id at
473.
131. Id at 474-75.
132. Id
133. Id. at 474.
134. Id at 464.
135. Id. at 480.
136. Id. at 481.
137. Id
138. Id. at 482. The court rejected the "mass asset rule." The mass asset rule states that
where the purchased assets are indivisible or considered one "mass" without a determinable
life, the Service will not allow a depreciation deduction with respect to any of the underlying
assets in the mass. See, e.g., Thrifticheck Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1038 (1960),
afld, 287 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1961); United States Indus. Alcohol Co. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A.
1323 (1940), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. United States Indus. Alcohol Co. v. Helver-
ing, 137 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1943); Danville Press, Inc. v. Commissioner, 1 B.T.A. 1171 (1925).
The assets are in effect one "mass asset" in the nature of goodwill; they are therefore nondepre-
ciable. Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 482 (citing Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v.
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dual burden of proving that the asset was separate and distinct from good-
will and that it had a limited useful life.139
The court next rebutted each of the Commissioner's arguments. In partic-
ular, the Commissioner argued that the terminable at will nature of bank
deposits rendered the deposit relationship a component of goodwill and
therefore nonamortizable. 1" The court, however, determined that termina-
ble at will14 relationships were not equivalent to goodwill as a matter of
law, citing several federal circuit courts of appeals cases to support its con-
clusion. 42 The court suggested that if the taxpayer could prove that the
asset in question had a limited useful life, then the court might consider the
asset as separate and distinct from goodwill. 43 After summarily disposing
of several minor arguments by the Commissioner,'" the court continued its
analysis of the separate and distinct issue by noting two additional factors.
United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1249-50 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974)).
Although some of the underlying assets may have limited useful lives, the deduction will be
denied based upon the unlimited useful life of the mass. Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 444 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1971), affg 307 F. Supp. 1304 (N.D. Ala. 1969).
139. Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 482.
140. Id. at 483.
141. Terminable at will relationships are those in which either party may end the relation-
ship at any time for any reason. In the context of bank deposits, the depositor may withdraw
its funds at any time for any reason.
142. Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 483 (citing Sunset Fuel Co. v. United States, 519 F.2d
781 (9th Cir. 1975); Skilken v. Commissioner, 420 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1969); Boe v. Commis-
sioner, 307 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1962); Thrifticheck Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 1 (2d
Cir. 1961); United States Indus. Alcohol Co. v. Helvering, 137 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1943); Impe-
rial News Co. v. United States, 576 F. Supp. 865 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 1434 (2d
Cir. 1984); General Television, Inc. v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 609 (D. Minn. 1977), afl'd
per curiam, 598 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1979); Golden State Towel & Linen Serv., Ltd. v. United
States, 179 Ct. Cl. 300 (1967)).
143. Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 483-89.
144. First, the Commissioner argued that the acquired core deposits are a liability to the
bank and that any attempt to recharacterize it as an asset is misleading. Id at 490. Rejecting
this argument, the court held that what the taxpayer has quantified is the future benefit from
the deposit liabilities, which qualify as an asset to the bank. Id. Next, the court rejected
outright the Commissioner's argument that it should deny the deduction because the treatment
by the purchaser is inconsistent with that of the seller. Id The court noted that if it accepted
the Commissioner's argument, the effect upon goodwill itself would be curious. Id at 491
n. 14. Because the seller does not reflect the internally created goodwill on its books, the issue
of whether an intangible is apart from goodwill would never arise because the purchaser would
not record goodwill in the first place. Id. The Commissioner next argued that the "deposit
base cannot be transferred apart from a transfer of the goodwill of a bank" and that it is
inseparable from the goodwill. Id. at 492. Relying upon Laird v. United States, 556 F.2d 1224
(5th Cir. 1977), the court refused to require the separate transferability of the core deposits to
establish that the intangible has a value separate and distinct from goodwill. Citizens & South-
ern, 91 T.C. at 492-93. The court also rejected the Commissioner's arguments that Citizens &
Southern's calculation of the acquired bank's goodwill was greatly undervalued, that the allo-
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First, the court opined that the fact that customers may open new ac-
counts as old accounts are closed does not make the deposit base self regen-
erative.' 45 The court noted that the value of the deposit base reflects only
the accounts purchased at the acquisition date.' 46 Thus, any subsequent ac-
counts opened by Citizens & Southern will be internally generated and will
not give rise to, or increase, the acquired core deposits. Second, the court
posited that the value of the deposit base does not rest upon a vague notion
that depositors will leave their deposits in the bank for some unspecified time
period. 147 Rather, as the bank's expert pointed out, depositors are subject to
an inertia; 4 ' the value of the deposit base "rests upon the ascertainable
probability that [this] inertia" will force depositors to maintain their ac-
counts for predictable intervals of time. ' 49 The court thereby concluded that
the "deposit base has an ascertainable cost basis separate and distinct from
[both] the goodwill and the going-concern value of the [a]cquired
[blanks."'
151
The court significantly refined its separate and distinct analysis in Citizens
& Southern. The court implicitly redefined the issue to be whether aportion
of the deposit base is separate and distinct from goodwill, rather than deter-
mining whether the deposit base must be wholly separate and distinct from
cation was purely tax motivated and "self-serving accounting shenanigans," and that the pre-
mium was attributable to the insurance protection provided by the FDIC. Id. at 493-95.
145. Id. at 499 (citing Computing & Software, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 223, 236
(1975)). The court in Computing & Software held that a purchased file containing customers'
credit information was an intangible asset separate and distinct from goodwill with a limited
useful life. Computing & Software, 64 T.C. at 232, 236. The Commissioner in Computing &
Software missed the issue because the wasting asset was the credit information contained in the
files at the date of purchase. Moreover, the Commissioner failed to recognize that the fact that
new credit information would replace the purchased information did not require a holding that
the purchased credit file had an indefinite life. Id. at 236-37.
The credit file in Computing & Software parallels the deposit base intangible. As the ac-
quired depositors close their accounts, new depositors will replace them. This should not af-
fect the determination regarding the acquired core deposits. In addition, one can argue that
the depositor is not required to close its account in order to prove that the core deposits are
"wasting." Rather, as the depositor withdraws the funds that were the subject of the acquisi-
tion from its account, the acquired deposit base has in fact "wasted." If the depositor subse-
quently deposits additional funds into its account, these new funds are internally generated
core deposits and as such are not depreciable. See supra note 84.
146. Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 499.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 500. Financial analysts base this inertia upon a combination of transactional
costs, interest rate differentials, and dissatisfaction with the quality of the services the bank
provides. Id. The sum of the interest rate differentials and the value assigned to the dissatis-
faction with the bank's services must be greater than the transactional costs before a customer





goodwill.15 Furthermore, the court recognized that this portion of the de-
posit base that is separate and distinct from goodwill may have a limited
useful life. 52 The court, answering these two questions in the affirmative,
afforded Citizens & Southern a depreciation deduction.
1 53
By focusing on the question of whether a portion of the intangible's value,
as opposed to the whole value, is separate and distinct from goodwill, the
court's reasoning is circular. The issue for the court's consideration was
whether the deposit base intangible is an asset separate and distinct from
goodwill. By narrowing its focus to examining whether a portion of the de-
posit base is separate and distinct from goodwill, suggesting that it would
permit a depreciation deduction for that separate portion, the court returned
to its initial question of whether that portion of the deposit base is separate
and distinct from goodwill. This subtle distinction, however, indicates that
the court believes that at least some deduction is warranted based upon the
separate nature of the deposit base intangible from goodwill. The fact that
the taxpayer had substantial documentation as to the deposit base intangi-
ble's limited useful life was further support for the court's finding that at
least a portion of the deposit base intangible is separate and distinct from
goodwill. 5 4 Thus, the Tax Court held in Citizens & Southern that the core
deposit base had an ascertainable cost basis separate and distinct from good-
will. ' After reaching this conclusion, the court analyzed the useful life of
the core deposit base.'5 6
In making the useful life determination, Citizens & Southern did not fall
into the trap that snared Banc One.' 57 Citizens & Southern performed its
allocations prior to the acquisition and performed its lifing analysis, an esti-
mation of the deposit base intangible's useful life, as of the end of the tax
year in question.15 8 Two additional factors weighed in Citizens & South-
ern's favor. First, the valuation reports relied upon by Citizens & Southern
were very detailed.' 59 Second, Citizens & Southern performed follow up
studies annually to validate its projections."W The court paid particular at-
tention to the fact that the results of the follow up studies closely approxi-
151. Id.; see also id at 516 (Cohen, J., concurring) (expressly defining the issue).
152. Id at 500.
153. Id. at 514.
154. Id. at 500-10.
155. Id. at 500.
156. See id. at 500-05.
157. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
158. Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 468-73; see also supra note 130.
159. Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 468-73; see also supra note 130.
160. Citizens and Southern, 91 T.C. at 501-02; see also supra text accompanying notes 131-
32.
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mated Citizens & Southern's estimates in rebutting several of the
Commissioner's allegations. 161 The court, therefore, concluded that the Cit-
izens & Southern acquired deposit base had a limited useful life, which the
bank ascertained with reasonable accuracy.' 62 Thus, Citizens & Southern
established the two elements necessary in order to qualify for a depreciation
deduction with respect to the deposit base.63
The Citizens & Southern court shifted its focus onto the proof offered in
support of the intangible asset's limited useful life and away from the sepa-
rate and distinct requirement. The court appeared willing, however, to con-
tinue inquiring into the characteristics of goodwill and the nature of the
intangible to determine whether there were two distinct assets or whether
the taxpayer was merely attempting to carve out and depreciate a portion of
goodwill. Assuming there are two distinct assets, the court's limited useful
life analysis determines what portion, if any, of the "separate" asset the tax-
payer can depreciate.
III. GOODWILL VERSUS CORE DEPOSITS: SEPARATE AND DISTINCT?
A. Characteristics of Goodwill
The case law does not set forth a precise definition of goodwill; instead,
one must synthesize numerous catch phrases to fully grasp the concept of
goodwill.'" Some courts have defined goodwill as the expectancy that "old
customers will resort to the old place"' 65 or the "expectancy of continued
patronage, for whatever reason."' 66 In addition, courts have recognized that
161. See id. at 502-05. The court stated:
This comparison also shows that the validity of the petitioner's projections was cor-
roborated by the actual closures.
Petitioner's followup study, however, shows that its projections of account lives were
reasonably accurate.
... However, petitioner's followup study tracked accounts that transferred from the
[a]cquired [blanks into any of the branches of petitioner within the State. The actual
closures, taking into account these transfers, were substantially the same as the pro-
jections of petitioner....
... Petitioner's projections... were also corroborated by the actual closures....
... Moreover, the validity of petitioner's estimates was corroborated by the actual
closures.
Id.
162. Id. at 505.
163. l
164. See AmSouth Bancorp. v. United States, 681 F.2d 698, 712 (N.D. Ala. 1988).
165. Commissioner v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir. 1963) (quoting Nelson Weaver
Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 897, 901 (5th Cir. 1962)).
166. Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962).
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a purchaser of a going concern may acquire goodwill where the "transfer
enables the purchaser 'to step into the shoes of the seller.' "167
"The chief elements of... goodwill are continuity of place and continuity
of name." 16' An entity builds up its goodwill, in part, by establishing itself
and surviving long enough in the marketplace. Goodwill also includes a
business' advantageous location, 169 the reputation of the business entity
through the customer's eye,17 and the competitive edge inherent in a busi-
ness. 171 These nebulous characteristics make it difficult to define goodwill
with precision. 172 If goodwill is viewed in light of the business entity as a
whole, however, and not as a discrete asset, the boundaries of the asset be-
come apparent.
Goodwill attaches to the business when the individual assets work as a
unit. 1 7  Generally, goodwill has no value in and of itself, and the purchaser
cannot acquire goodwill apart from the underlying assets of the business. 174
A business cannot sell off its goodwill and retain the productive elements of
167. Balthrope v. Commissioner, 356 F.2d 28, 32 n.1 (5th Cir. 1966) (quoting Mas-
quelette's Estate v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1956)).
168. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Good Will § 4 (1968) (footnote omitted).
169. Id. § 5.
170. See id. § 6.
171. Id § 7. "'Men will pay for any privilege that gives a reasonable expectancy of prefer-
ence in the race of competition. Such expectancy may come from succession in place or name
or otherwise to a business that has won the favor of its customers. It is then known as good
will.'" 15 MERTEN, supra note 81, § 59.56 n.93 (quoting In re Brown, 242 N.Y. 1, 150 N.E.
581 (1926) (citation omitted)).
172. See 15 MERTEN, supra note 81, § 59.56 n.93. "'Efforts by different courts and legal
writers to frame an adequate definition [of goodwill] have resulted in a legion of concepts
ranging widely in degrees of complexity.'" Id (quoting Wright, Nature and Basis of Legal
Good Will, 24 ILL L. REv. 20, 20 (1929)).
173. Going concern value is distinguishable from goodwill. Going concern value is, in
essence, the additional element of value which attaches to property by reason of its existence in
a going concern. Conestoga Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 506, 514 (1951). The the-
ory behind going concern value is that a business, even in the absence of goodwill, will con-
tinue to generate earnings without interruption after a change in ownership. See, e.g., Winn-
Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. United States, 444 F.2d 677, 685 n.12 (5th Cir. 1971); Computing
& Software, Inc. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 223, 235 (1975). While some courts have stated
that the difference between goodwill and going concern value is merely technical, the better
view is that going concern value is a broader concept, with goodwill usually representing a
substantial portion of going concern value. See supra note 6. The main point with respect to
going concern value is that, as with goodwill, it does not have a determinable useful life and is
nondepreciable.
174. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Good Will § 3 (1968) ("it has no existence as property in and of itself,
as a separate and distinct entity, but only as an incident of a continued business"); cf 15
MERTEN, supra note 81, § 59.59 n.28 ("It is not necessarily true that the goodwill of a business
cannot be transferred apart from any tangible assets.").
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the business, except in rare cases. 17" The impact of goodwill not only affects
the price of the business as a whole, however, but also affects the value of the
individual assets.
The fact that a business has substantial goodwill will increase the value of
individual assets because an asset currently in use will garner a higher price
in the market than an idle asset.' 76 This increase in value does not prohibit
the purchaser from depreciating the asset merely because a portion of the
asset's value is attributable to goodwill.' 7 7 The distinction must be made
between an asset that is inextricably linked to goodwill and an asset whose
value is enhanced by the goodwill of the entity. The former is afforded no
depreciation deduction, while the latter is depreciable. If, in the latter case,
goodwill impacts upon the value of the individual assets, and if the cost of
the asset attributable to goodwill is nondepreciable, then the purchaser must
adjust the fair market value of all purchased assets to reflect the fair value of
the asset in a nongoing concern, or in a similar entity with little or no
goodwill. 178
175. A nonpersonal service business may sell a portion of its goodwill by franchising out its
name. If the entity has a reputable and well recognized trade name, then it may transfer
goodwill if the customers need only see the trade name, and they will patronize the establish-
ment. 15 MERTEN, supra note 81, § 59.59 n.28; ee also 38 AM JUR. 2D Good Will § 6 (1968).
Because this issue does not arise in the case of core deposits, it is beyond the scope of this
Comment.
176. This is due to the fact that a productive asset is worth more to the seller than a
nonproductive one. The seller will hold out for a higher price, forcing the buyer to raise his
bid or look elsewhere for a comparable asset.
177. The calculation of the depreciation deduction is based upon the asset's adjusted basis
as provided in section 1011 of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 167(g) (West Supp. 1990).
Section 1011 provides that the asset's adjusted basis is its section 1012 cost basis as adjusted by
section 1016. I.R.C. § 1011 (West Supp. 1990). The focus, therefore, becomes what the asset
cost the taxpayer, not whether any portion of that cost is due to goodwill.
178. For example, consider a machine operated in a going concern with considerable good-
will. The fair market value of a similar machine that is idle might be worth $100. Because the
asset is more productive in the going concern, the seller would require a sales price of $110 for
the individual asset. In addition, if the purchaser desired to purchase the entire business, he
must pay, because the seller would demand, a price above the sum total of the value of the
individual assets. Therefore, the purchaser may finally pay $115 for the asset. If the asset is
denied a depreciation deduction because a portion of the asset's value is attributable to good-
will, then the purchaser must recalculate and reduce the asset's value to reflect its value in a
nongoing concern.
In a business purchase transaction, the last five dollar increment in the above hypothetical is
usually readily quantifiable and is consequently treated as goodwill. In constrast, the ten dol-
lar increment from $100 to $110 usually is not readily quantifiable. More importantly, the
question is whether the law requires that the total cost of the asset be separate and distinct
from goodwill. If so, then no depreciation deduction for the entire $115 asset is allowed. If the
law requires only that the asset be separate and distinct for valuation purposes, however, then
the $110 is an asset separate and distinct from goodwill, thereby satisfying the first require-
Core Deposit Base
The purchaser must adjust the fair market value to separate out the depre-
ciable and nondepreciable portions of the asset's cost. The court in Citizens
& Southern properly concluded that neither the Code nor the regulations
require such a result.179 The court required only that the core deposit base
be separate and distinct from goodwill for valuation purposes. After estab-
lishing such an independent value, a court must then inquire into what por-
tion of that value has a limited useful life.
Therefore, one must contrast the characteristics of the deposit base intan-
gible with the characteristics of goodwill to determine whether the core de-
posit intangible is inextricably linked to goodwill. The court should consider
in this analysis that the goodwill of an entity will affect the valuation of the
deposit base intangible. This does not preclude a depreciation deduction for
the intangible asset, however, once the purchaser demonstrates that the de-
posit base intangible has a limited useful life.18°
B. Characteristics of the Core Deposit Base
1. Future Income
The deposit base intangible's main characteristic is future income. When
a bank acquires another bank, it knows approximately how long the ac-
quired depositors will keep their deposited funds on deposit with the
bank.' The bank bases its estimate on its past experience.' 8 2 The bank
will derive a benefit from these funds in the nature of income, generated in
future years, by calculating the differential between the earnings on these
deposits and the cost of these funds to the bank.'8 3 The seller, aware of this
fact, will build the discounted value of that benefit into its asking price. The
acquiring bank "purchases" the future income, and the deposit base intangi-
ble represents the purchaser's cost of the discounted value of the future in-
come stream.
This purchase of future income can be distinguished from goodwill. The
deposit base intangible represents future income relating to one individual
component part of the business entity: the acquired core deposits. In con-
ment for depreciability. The issue thus becomes how much, if any, of the remaining $110 has a
limited useful life.
179. See Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463, 500 (1988), affd with-
out opinion, 900 F.2d 266 (11th Cir. 1990); see also id. at 516 (Cohen, J., concurring).
180. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
181. See Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 505.
182. Id.; see also supra note 130.
183. See supra note 130.
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trast, goodwill generally relates to a premium inherent in the total business
entity that operates as a unit." 4
Admittedly, the depositor's relationship with a bank falls within the "old
customers returning to the old place" language so often quoted as a defini-
tion of goodwill."8 5 The court, however, has frequently held that intangible
assets, such as subscription and customer lists, are amortizable despite the
fact that a portion of their value is related to continued patronage.18 6 The
separate and distinct analysis represents a facts and circumstances test,
wherein no one factor is determinative.
2 Severability of the Core Deposit Base from the Business Entity
Core deposits are a discrete component of a bank and are severable from
the bank's business as a whole.' 87 As in Midlantic, courts inquire into an
asset's severability when considering whether the asset is in the nature of
goodwill.' Because goodwill generally is transferred only upon the sale of
the entire business," 9 then if the taxpayer can transfer the asset individually,
one can argue that the asset is not akin to goodwill. Pure deposit assump-
tion transactions, transactions in which the purchaser acquires only the
bank's core deposits, do occur frequently in the banking industry."° In such
cases, when the purchaser acquires only core deposits, it leaves behind the
184. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Panichi v. United States, 834 F.2d 300, 301-02 (2d Cir. 1987) (the court held
that the customer list acquired was an asset separate from the going concern with a determi-
nable useful life and was therefore depreciable); Donrey, Inc. v. United States, 809 F.2d 534
(8th Cir. 1987) (taxpayer permitted to amortize subscription list acquired in the purchase of a
going concern); Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1246-1247
(5th Cir. 1973) (taxpayer permitted amortization deduction for subscription list after court
found that the asset had a limited useful life of ascertainable duration), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1129 (1974); Super Food Serv., Inc. v. United States, 416 F.2d 1236, 1240 (7th Cir. 1969)
(court repudiated mass asset doctrine and permitted taxpayer to take an amortization deduc-
tion for acquired franchise contracts on a showing of a limited useful life).
187. See Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463, 492 (1988), a ffd with-
out opinion, 900 F.2d 266 (11th Cir. 1990).
188. See Winn-Dixie Montgomery, Inc. v. United States, 444 F.2d 677, 679-80 (5th Cir.
1971); Marsh & McLennan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 420 F.2d 667, 668-70 (3d Cir. 1969);
Golden State Towel & Linen Serv., Ltd. v. United States, 373 F.2d 938, 940-41 (Ct. Cl. 1967);
Boe v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1962). But see Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C.
at 493 (holding that separate transferability is not required in order to establish that the deposit
base has a value separate and distinct from goodwill).
189. See supra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., AmSouth Bancorp. v. United States, 681 F. Supp. 698, 708 (N.D. Ala. 1988);
accord Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 492. Pure deposit assumption transactions occur when
the deposit liabilities of a bank are acquired without acquiring any of the bank's other assets or
liabilities. Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 492.
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trade name of the former bank, its operating structure, physical assets, and
any goodwill.
In transactions involving the transfer of multiple assets, a group of which
are similar in nature to goodwill, courts have applied the mass asset rule1 91
and denied the depreciation deductions claimed for these assets with charac-
teristics similar to goodwill.192 Generally, courts refuse to apply the mass
asset doctrine where the assets individually have a separate value that can be
readily identified.' 93 In the case of the core deposit intangible, when a tax-
payer sufficiently carries its burden of proof, the court can separately quan-
tify the value of the asset, rendering the mass asset rule inapplicable.
Therefore, the severability of the deposit base intangible from the business
entity, coupled with the lack of support for the mass asset rule, supports a
holding that the deposit base intangible is separate and distinct from
goodwill.
3. The Terminable at Will Nature of the Core Deposit Base is Not
Dispositive
One characteristic of the core deposit intangible, to which goodwill is
linked, is its terminable at will nature. 94 The Commissioner argues that
because depositors may withdraw their funds at any time, the bank has ac-
quired only an expectancy of continued patronage, which is the hallmark of
goodwill.'" While several court holdings applied this rationale,'
96 most of
these cases were decided upon evidentiary failures on the part of the taxpay-
ers.' 97 To sustain a depreciation deduction, a taxpayer must demonstrate
that the deposit base intangible has a value separate and distinct from the
overall goodwill of the acquired bank.
191. See supra note 138.
192. See Thrifticheck Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1038, 1047 (1960) (the acquisi-
tion should be treated as the purchase of a single asset that does not exhaust over time, but
rather as one which has a continuing useful life), affd, 287 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1961); cf. Super
Food Serv., Inc. v. United States, 416 F.2d 1236, 1239 (7th Cir. 1969) (the "mass asset doc-
trine has recently been subject to strong criticism" and the court did not apply the doctrine
where the taxpayer had individually valued the assets in question).
193. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Seaboard Fin. Co., 367 F.2d 646, 652 (9th Cir. 1966); Laird
v. U.S., 556 F.2d 1224, 1232-33 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978).
194. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 164-66.
196. Sunset Fuel Co. v. United States, 519 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1975); Skilken v. Commis-
sioner, 420 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1969), affgl 50 T.C. 902 (1968); Imperial News Co. v. United
States, 576 F. Supp. 865 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affid, 742 F.2d 1434 (2d Cir. 1984); General Televi-
sion, Inc. v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 609 (1978), ar'd, 598 F.2d 1148 (8th Cir. 1979).
197. Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463, 482 (1988), affld without
opinion, 900 F.2d 266 (1 1th Cir. 1990); Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States,
481 F.2d 1240, 1249 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974).
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In addition, the terminable at will nature of core deposits impacts upon
the requirement that an amortizable intangible must have a limited useful
life.198 When balancing the issue of whether the deposit base intangible is
separate and distinct from goodwill, courts should consider the taxpayer's
proof as to the intangible's limited useful life. This is due to the theory be-
hind nonamortizability of goodwill: Goodwill is a nonwasting asset, the life
of which the taxpayer cannot reasonably determine. If the taxpayer can
demonstrate that the deposit base intangible has a limited useful life, the
court should give less weight to the threshold question of whether it is an
asset separate and distinct from goodwill.
4. The Overall Balance of the Characteristics of the Core Deposit Base
On balance, the question whether the core deposit intangible is separate
and distinct from goodwill is uncertain. The deposit base intangible repre-
sents, at least partially, continued patronage and the notion that customers
return to familiar places. 199 Core deposits are severable, however, from the
business entity, which negates the characteristic of goodwill that it attaches
to the entity as a whole and emanates from the individual assets working as a
unit.2°° In addition, the acquired bank may merge with the acquiring bank,
thereby changing the acquired bank's name and location. This type of trans-
action destroys the characteristics of goodwill relating to continuity of name
and place.2 °1 Moreover, the fact that a portion of the intangible's value re-
flects goodwill is not determinative of the question whether the asset is sepa-
rate and distinct from goodwill as a whole.
2°2
The more important question in resolving the debate over the
depreciability of the deposit base intangible is whether the taxpayer has es-
tablished that the asset has a limited useful life.203 The rationale behind
holding goodwill nondepreciable is that this asset is nonwasting and lacks a
determinable useful life.2' The core deposit base intangible, however, pos-
sesses none of these characteristics.
198. See supra text accompanying note 143.
199. Compare supra text accompanying notes 185-86 with text accompanying notes 164-67.
200. Compare supra text accompanying notes 173-75 with text accompanying notes 187-90.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 168-70.
202. See supra note 178 and text accompanying notes 176-79.
203. See Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463, 516 (1988) (Cohen, J.,
concurring) ("It seems to me that the requirement that an asset be separate and distinct means
only that it must have a measurable value for a specific use."), ajj'd without opinion, 900 F.2d
266 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
204. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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IV. COMMENT: LOOKING TO THE DEPosrF BASE INTANGIBLE'S
LIMITED USEFUL LIFE
A. Establishing the Limited Useful Life
Section 1.167(a)-I (b) of the Treasury regulations provides that a taxpayer
may establish the useful life of an asset for depreciation based upon its expe-
rience with similar property or the general experience of the industry.
20 5
Courts have held that the issue of whether the asset has a useful life is a
question of fact, which the court will decide based upon the record.2 "6
Courts have determined that the core deposit intangible is a wasting as-
set.2' 7 In Midlantic, the Tax Court analyzed the useful life of the bank's
deposit base.2 08 Midlantic demonstrated that a portion of the acquired de-
positors would leave their bank based upon historical data.2' Therefore,
because the record indicated with reasonable accuracy that between ten and
fifteen percent of Midlantic's purchased deposit accounts would close each
year, the court concluded that Midlantic proved the useful life of its core
deposit base.2 0
The Citizens & Southern court also had no difficulty in determining that
the bank sustained its burden of proof with respect to the useful life of the
core deposit base.2" The court noted that the analysts, engaged to deter-
mine the asset's useful life, performed detailed analysis.2 12 The resulting re-
ports revealed that the acquired core deposits steadily decreased and would
eventually be eliminated and replaced by Citizens & Southern's own inter-
nally generated core deposits.213
Even though the Midlantic and Citizens & Southern courts determined
that the deposit base intangible had a limited useful life, courts must recog-
nize that the Code and the regulations only require a "reasonable" approxi-
mation of the intangible's limited useful life.214 If a taxpayer can
205. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(b) (as amended in 1972).
206. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 481 F.2d 1240, 1245-47 (1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974).
207. AmSouth Bancorp. v. United States, 681 F. Supp. 698, 714 (N.D. Ala. 1988); Citizens
& Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463, 500-05 (1988), affid without opinion, 900
F.2d 266 (1 1th Cir. 1990); accord Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. 1464,
1474 (1983).
208. Midlantic, 46 T.C.M. at 1471-75.
209. Id at 1474-75.
210. Id. at 1475.
211. Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 500-05.
212. Id at 468-73; see also supra note 130 and accompanying text.
213. Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 499.
214. I.R.C. § 167(a) (West Supp. 1990); Treas. Reg. § 1. 167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960); see
also supra notes 7, 9.
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demonstrate through historical data that the deposit base is a wasting asset,
the court should allow a depreciation deduction. In addition, although the
determination of the asset's useful life must occur as of the end of the tax
year,2 15 courts should review the total record before them, including any
post acquisition studies. For example, in Citizens & Southern, the court
found the post acquisition studies further supported Citizens & Southern's
claim that the core deposit intangible had a limited useful life.216 Courts
should not close their eyes to evidence of the deposit base intangible's useful
life by holding the asset nonamortizable as a matter of law. Instead, courts
should apply the same standard they would apply to similar intangible as-
sets: a facts and circumstances standard.217
B. A Comparison of the Core Deposit Base to Other
Amortizable Intangibles
Courts have held that the core deposit base is similar to several intangible
assets that are amortizable, such as subscription lists, insurance expirations,
and customer lists. 21s A review of these rulings lends support to a holding
that the deposit base is amortizable.
1. Subscription Lists
Subscription lists include the names, addresses, and personal information
of customers or subscribers to a particular publication. 219 These lists are
similar to the deposit base in that their value is based in part on the custom-
ers' willingness to retain or renew their subscriptions. 220 Additionally, both
core deposits and the subscriptions are terminable at will.
221
215. See supra note 86 and text accompanying notes 86-90.
216. Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 502-05; see also Super Foods Sere., Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 416 F.2d 1236, 1240 (9th Cir. 1969) (evidence of petitioner's subsequent experience,
however, is acceptable to corroborate its projections); supra note 161 and accompanying text.
217. See generally infra text accompanying notes 222-25, 231, 235-38.
218. See, e.g., Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974); Panichi v. United States, 834 F.2d 300 (2d Cir.
1987); Donrey, Inc. v. United States, 809 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1987); Union Bankers Ins. Co. v.
Commissioner, 64 T.C. 807 (1975); Manhattan Co. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 78 (1968).
219. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1280 (5th ed. 1979); see Donrey, Inc. v. United States,
809 F.2d 534, 535-36 (8th Cir. 1987) (the value of the subscription list is equal to the "present
value of the difference in advertising revenues generated by the subscription list as compared to
the revenues of an equivalent paper without a subscription list").
220. Similarly, a portion of the value of the deposit base relates to the depositors' willing-
ness to keep their funds in the bank. See supra note 140.
221. The subscriber is generally not bound to renew its subscription. Once the term of the
subscription has expired, the subscriber may decide not to renew the subscription, letting the
subscription lapse. The purchaser of the subscription list will use the list to solicit a continua-
tion of the current subscription and will attempt to sell additional subscriptions. For a discus-
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Despite the fact that the subscription list represents a relationship involv-
ing the notion of continued patronage, which is similar to goodwill 222 and
the core deposit intangible,223 courts have held that these factors are not an
absolute bar to depreciability. 224 Rather, courts have determined that the
relevant inquiry is whether the taxpayer has proven that the subscription list
has a limited useful life capable of reasonable estimation through sufficiently
competent evidence. 225 This analysis similarly applies to the deposit base
intangible.
2. Insurance Expirations
Insurance expirations are "the ifies of an insurance agency indicating a
policyholder's insurance coverage, types of policies, and the beginning and
termination dates of the present policies in force. ' '226 The purchaser of in-
surance policy expiration lists has access to valuable policyholder informa-
tion.227 This information is necessary to contact the policyholder for the
purpose of soliciting continued or future patronage.228 As time passes, the
lists become outdated and worthless because of changes in policyholder data.
These lists are similar to goodwill and the deposit base intangible because
the value of the lists represents a potential future income stream. In addi-
tion, insurance expirations are terminable at will, similar to the core deposit
intangible.229 The insured can permit a policy to lapse, thereby terminating
the business relationship at will, just as the depositor can demand its money
from the bank at any time. Moreover, the insurance expiration lists are sev-
erable from general insurance company business, a factor which is similar to
sion of the terminable at will nature of the deposit base intangible, see supra text accompanying
notes 140-42, 145-50.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 165-66.
223. See supra text accompanying note 185.
224. Panichi v. United States, 834 F.2d 300, 301-02 (2d Cir. 1987) (taxpayer acquired cus-
tomer list and court found asset amortizable because the list had a discrete value with a dis-
cernable life span of fifteen years); Donrey, Inc. v. United States, 809 F.2d 534 (8th Cir. 1987)
(taxpayer permitted to amortize the value assigned to a subscription list in the purchase of a
going concern); Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1245-51
(5th Cir. 1973) (the taxpayer purchased a subscription ist and engaged valuation engineers
that established a five year useful life), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1129 (1974).
225. Houston Chronicle, 481 F.2d at 1249.
226. Tomlinson v. Commissioner, 507 F.2d 723, 725 n.l (9th Cir. 1974); Rev. Rul. 65-180,
1965-2 C.B. 279.
227. The list is valuable until the individual's current policy lapses, or until the time at
which the holder cancels his current policy, whichever is earlier. The agent can solicit the
policyholder as his current policy nears expiration and a short time thereafter.
228. Decker v. Commissioner, 864 F.2d 51, 52 (7th Cir. 1988).
229. Compare Union Bankers Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 807, 811-17 (1975) with
supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
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the core deposits' severability from the bank's other business.230 In sum,
courts have upheld the amortization deduction for insurance expiration lists,
where the taxpayer has sustained the burden of proving that the list has a
distinct value apart from goodwill and a limited useful life.23 '
3. Customer Lists
Like subscription lists, customer lists detail the personal information of a
particular business' patrons.232 The history of the amortization of customer
lists parallels that of the deposit base. In early cases, courts addressing the
amortizability of customer lists held that the lists were not amortizable be-
cause they had an unlimited useful life.2 3 3 Later, courts recognized the asset
as an indivisible part of a bundle of "mass assets" not subject to deprecia-
23tion.  Once courts became familiar with the nature of customer lists and
the use of these lists in the business community, however, courts retreated
from their hard line position.235
Currently, most courts reject the Commissioner's application of a per se
rule of nonamortizability to customer lists when there' is a portion of the
purchase price of the list that has a limited useful life.236 Courts assert that
no logical reason exists to prevent the allocation of the purchase price of the
customer list among its depreciable and nondepreciable portions237 once a
taxpayer has established a separate value for the asset apart from goodwill.
Where there is a separate and distinct value apart from goodwill, the analy-
sis shifts to determining what amount, if any, has a limited useful life.
Courts have properly exercised their judgment with respect to the
depreciability of the customer list 238 and should properly extend the same
rationale to the deposit base intangible because to disallow an amortization
deduction for such assets, under circumstances similar to Citizens & South-
ern, "would be the one completely wrong conclusion. "239
230. Compare Union Bankers, 64 T.C. at 840 with supra notes 187-90 and accompanying
text.
231. See, e.g., Union Bankers, 64 T.C. at 807; Richard Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States,
537 F.2d 446, 449 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
232. Manhattan Co. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 78, 80-81 (1968).
233. See, e.g., Anchor Cleaning Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1029 (1954).
234. See, e.g., Thrifticheck Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1038 (1960). Courts have
since held that the mass asset rule is not a per se rule of nonamortizability. See supra note 138.
235. Manhattan Co., 50 T.C. at 93-94 (1968).
236. Panichi v. United States, 834 F.2d 300, 301-02 (2d Cir. 1987); Donrey, Inc. v. United
States, 809 F.2d 534, 536-37 (8th Cir. 1987); ABCO Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1280, 1283 (1990).
237. Manhattan Co., 50 T.C. at 91.




This brief look at other intangible assets demonstrates that courts are will-
ing to recognize that a number of intangible assets are amortizable. As the
regulations provide, goodwill is the only intangible asset that is nonamortiz-
able as a matter of law.2' The courts should continue to look to the under-
lying rationale behind the mandate for holding goodwill nondepreciable and
apply this rationale to each new case claiming a depreciation deduction for
an intangible asset. In particular, courts should apply the rationale that
nonwasting assets are-nondepreciable and focus on whether a taxpayer has
sufficiently demonstrated the "wasting" of the intangible asset.
C. The Judicial Spotlight is on the Asset's Limited Useful Life
The court in Citizens & Southern did not hold that the core deposit base is
separate and distinct from goodwill as a matter of law.24" ' At least one legal
commentator, however, contends that such a determination is the "real" is-
sue behind the depreciability of the core deposit intangible.242 Considering
the "facts and circumstances" in assessing the depreciation deduction for the
core deposit base, the Citizens & Southern court was correct in not applying
a per se rule to resolve the issue. The Code does not state that taxpayers
may take a deduction for property used in a trade or business that has a
limited useful life and is separate and distinct from goodwill.24 3 Rather, the
Code provides an allowance for depreciation for property used in a trade or
business that will exhaust over time, or that is subject to obsolescence. 2 "
The requirement frequently followed by courts, that an intangible asset
must be separate and distinct from goodwill in order to qualify for a depreci-
ation deduction, is not in the Code.245 The concept of an asset's separate
and distinct nature, however, is useful to the courts. Specifically, the lan-
guage is helpful in determining whether the asset in question is so similar to
goodwill that a court cannot allow a depreciation deduction because of its
indeterminable useful life. Courts must recognize, however, that simply be-
cause an asset may have some "indicia" of goodwill, the asset should not be
denied depreciability.
Courts are correct in putting the spotlight on the proof offered by the
taxpayer with respect to the asset's useful life, rather than focusing more
heavily on whether the deposit base is separate and distinct from goodwill as
240. See Treas. Reg. § 1. 167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960); see also supra note 9.
241. Citizens & Southern Corp. V. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463, 500 (1988), a.rfd without
opinion, 900 F.2d 266 (1lth Cir. 1990).
242. Blasi, supra note 17, at 5.
243. See I.R.C. § 167(a) (West Supp. 1990); see also supra note 7.
244. I.R.C. § 167(a) (West Supp. 1990); see also supra note 7.
245. See I.R.C. § 167(a) (West Supp. 1990); see also supra note 7.
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a matter of law. Once the court determines that the asset is separate and
distinct from goodwill for valuation purposes, the depreciation analysis
shifts to ascertaining the asset's value that is subject to depreciation. More
precisely, once the taxpayer satisfies the threshold analysis that the intangi-
ble in question has a separate value apart from any goodwill, the court
should inquire into what specific portion of the asset's cost has a limited
useful life.
Applying this rationale to the core deposit base, it is evident that the core
deposit intangible has a separate value apart from goodwill.2" The core
deposit intangible represents future income derived from reinvesting the ac-
quired core deposits less the associated costs relating to these deposits.247
This value is related solely to the acquired core deposits and is a separate
component of the purchase price. The value assigned to the core deposit
base is distinguishable from the value of the overall goodwill of the acquired
banks. The purchaser calculates overall goodwill acquired in the purchase
after it determines the sum total of all the individual asset values, which
includes the value of the deposit base intangible. Under this analysis, the
core deposit base intangible has a value separate and distinct from goodwill,
thereby satisfying the threshold question.
The limited useful life analysis focuses the depreciation analysis toward
the mandates of the Code. The threshold determination as to the asset's
separateness from goodwill properly excludes from the class of depreciable
intangible assets any asset that is so akin to goodwill that any inquiry into
the asset's useful life is futile. The core deposit intangible is not such an
asset.
In cases such as Citizens & Southern, where the taxpayer performs a de-
tailed analysis as to an asset's value, uses this valuation in determining its
purchase price for the business, and allocates a significant portion of the
purchase price to goodwill,248 there is no justification for denying a deprecia-
tion deduction with respect to the core deposit base. The taxpayer fulfills the
requirements for a section 167 deduction when it develops a strong factual
and evidentiary position as to the value of the deposit base and its limited
useful life.
246. Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 500.
247. See supra note 130.
248. Citizens & Southern, 91 T.C. at 469 (the taxpayer allocated $10,496,372 to goodwill/




The Internal Revenue Code sets forth a two part test for depreciation of
assets. 249 First, the taxpayer must use the asset in a trade or business or hold
the asset for the production of income.25° Second, the taxpayer must use the
asset for only a limited period of time.25'" The burden of proof is upon the
taxpayer to prove by sufficient evidence both of these factors.
252
The regulations set forth the test regarding the depreciation of intangible
assets.253 The taxpayer must show that the intangible asset is used in the
business for only a limited period of time, which the taxpayer must measure
with reasonable accuracy.254 In addition, the regulations provide that a de-
preciation deduction will not be allowed with respect to goodwill.
255
The case law sets forth a two part test as to the depreciability of intangible
assets: The asset must be separate and distinct from goodwill and must have
a limited useful life.256 The deposit base intangible has characteristics simi-
lar to goodwill, such as a relationship based upon continued patronage.
25 7
The deposit base intangible is distinguishable from goodwill, however, in
that it is severable from the business entity25 and it lacks "continuity of
place and name.",259 In addition, the fact that goodwill may impact upon a
portion of the asset's value does not render the asset as a whole not separate
and distinct from goodwill.2 ' Lastly, a comparison of the core deposit in-
tangible to similar intangibles that courts have found depreciable lends fur-
ther support to a holding that the core deposit intangible is separate and
distinct from goodwill. Thus, on balance, the deposit base intangible has a
value separate and distinct from goodwill.
The rationale behind the depreciation deduction requires courts to focus
on the asset's limited useful life.261' Therefore, the question is not whether
the deposit base intangible is goodwill. Rather, the question is whether the
deposit base has a limited useful life. Through detailed valuation reports
249. I.R.C. § 167(a) (West Supp. 1990); see also supra note 7.
250. I.R.C. § 167(a) (West Supp. 1990).
251. Id
252. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
253. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960); see also supra note 9.
254. Treas. Reg. § 1. 167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960).
255. Id.
256. Citizens & Southern Corp. v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 463, 479 (1988), aff'd without
opinion, 900 F.2d 266 (11th Cir. 1990).
257. Compare supra text accompanying note 166 with text accompanying note 185.
258. Compare supra text accompanying notes 173-75 with text accompanying notes 187-90.
259. Compare supra text accompanying note 168 with text accompanying note 190.
260. See supra note 178'and text accompanying notes 176-78.
261. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38, 203-04.
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and a collection of historical data describing the account lives of the core
deposits, the taxpayer can carry its burden of proof as to the deposit base
intangible's limited useful life. Even though the deposit base intangible has
certain indicia of goodwill, if the taxpayer demonstrates that the intangible
has a limited useful life, it has met the requirements of the Code and the
court must uphold a depreciation deduction with respect to the core deposit
intangible.
John L. Cleary, II
